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COMPATIBILITY OF UNILATERAL OPTION CLAUSES WITH THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Pavlo Malyuta 
Abstract: This article assesses the compatibility of unilateral option clauses with the 
ECHR. It distinguishes between the two types of such agreements: unilateral 
arbitration and unilateral litigation clauses. Unilateral arbitration agreements establish 
litigation as a default rule with an arbitration exception exercisable exclusively by a 
designated party (the beneficiary). Unilateral litigation clauses provide for arbitration 
as the default dispute resolution mechanism, but one party (the beneficiary) can choose 
litigation. The article argues that these clauses affect the safeguards of Article 6 ECHR 
differently. More specifically, I submit that unilateral litigation clauses entail a waiver 
of both the right of access to a court and the right of equal access to a court by the non-
beneficiary, whereas unilateral arbitration agreements result in a waiver by the non-
beneficiary only of the right of equal access to a court. The article further analyses 
unilateral option clauses in light of the requirements for a valid waiver of a right 
developed by the ECtHR. The paper concludes that these clauses are compatible with 
the ECHR because they constitute a valid waiver of the right of equal access to a court. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While an arbitration agreement obliges both parties to refer any future disputes between 
them to arbitration, unilateral option clauses adopt a different approach. These types of 
arbitration agreements provide one party (the beneficiary) with the advantage of 
choosing either litigation or arbitration, whereas the other party (the non-beneficiary) 
is confined to only one type of dispute resolution. More specifically, a unilateral 
litigation clause provides for the resolution of disputes in arbitration and grants a 
litigation option to one of the parties, whereas a unilateral arbitration agreement binds 
the parties to refer their disputes to the courts of a particular jurisdiction but also gives 
one party an additional power to submit the claim to arbitration. 
 This article examines unilateral option clauses from the perspective of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter, ‘ECHR’). The European Court of 
Human Rights (hereafter, ‘ECtHR’) has consistently held that the concept of an 
arbitration agreement is compliant with the ECHR since it constitutes a valid waiver of 
a right to a court protected under Article 6 ECHR. However, this does not automatically 
entail that unilateral option clauses are also compatible with the ECHR. This article 
argues that unilateral option agreements affect the rights guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR 
differently from an arbitration clause. It analyses the decisions of Russian and English 
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courts with the aim of determining what rights in Article 6 ECHR are triggered by 
unilateral option agreements. The article submits that a unilateral litigation clause 
entails a waiver by the non-beneficiary of both the right of access to a court and the 
right of equal access to a court. In contrast, a unilateral arbitration agreement results 
only in a waiver of the right of equal access to a court by the non-beneficiary. The 
article then applies the requirements for a valid waiver of a right developed by the 
ECtHR to conclude that unilateral option clauses are a valid waiver of the right of equal 
access to a court and are therefore compatible with the ECHR. 
 The article explains the key features of unilateral option clauses in section B 
and scrutinises the relationship between arbitration and the ECHR in section C. 
Building upon this background, section D identifies the principles of Article 6 ECHR 
affected by unilateral option agreements. Section E demonstrates the different effects 
of unilateral arbitration and litigation clauses on the safeguards of Article 6 ECHR. 
Section F assesses whether unilateral option clauses constitute a valid waiver of the 
right of equal access to a court. 
 
B. BACKGROUND  
A unilateral dispute resolution agreement provides one party with the power to choose 
the forum in which to bring a dispute but deprives the other party of the same 
opportunity.1 These clauses are frequently used in loan agreements between banks or 
financial institutions, on the one hand, and commercial enterprises or consumers, on the 
other.2 Unilateral dispute resolution agreements appear in different shapes. For 
example, these clauses often empower a borrower to institute the proceedings only in 
the courts of a particular jurisdiction (or only in arbitration), whereas a lender can bring 
its claim before the competent courts of any state (or may choose either arbitration or 
litigation).3 Similar clauses are also encountered in charter parties, tenancy, and 
employment contracts.4 They are usually included in a contract in consideration for the 
higher risk assumed by the beneficiary of the option, although this is not always the 
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case.5 The significant feature of unilateral dispute resolution clauses is that they are 
tailored for the benefit of an economically stronger party and are primarily aimed at 
ensuring that a creditor has a number of ways to enforce its rights against the debtor’s 
assets.6 
 Unilateral dispute resolution agreements may be either pure choice of court 
clauses — known as unilateral or asymmetrical jurisdiction agreements7 — or they may 
include an arbitration option. This article deals with the latter type of clauses and refers 
to them as ‘unilateral option clauses’ or ‘unilateral option agreements’. Such clauses 
constitute a special type of an arbitration agreement.8 Both an arbitration agreement and 
a unilateral option clause imply the exclusion of courts’ jurisdiction. However, in the 
case of a unilateral option clause the exclusion takes place when the beneficiary 
commences arbitration proceedings, whereas for an arbitration agreement this occurs 
when the parties sign the agreement.  
 There are two forms of unilateral option agreements: unilateral arbitration 
clauses and unilateral litigation clauses.9 Unilateral arbitration clauses bind the parties 
to refer their disputes to the courts of a particular jurisdiction, but also give one party 
an additional power to submit a claim to arbitration.10 In other words, unilateral 
arbitration agreements establish litigation as a default rule with an arbitration exception 
exercisable exclusively by a designated party.11 By contrast, unilateral litigation 
clauses, which are less common, provide for the resolution of disputes in arbitration 
and grant a litigation option to one of the parties.12 Here, the default dispute resolution 
mechanism is arbitration, but one party can choose litigation.13 A party with the power 
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of choice under a unilateral option clause is commonly referred to as the ‘beneficiary’, 
whereas a party confined to either litigation or arbitration is the ‘non-beneficiary’.14 
 An important feature of both the unilateral arbitration clause and the unilateral 
litigation clause is that the beneficiary can exercise its option at the time of initiation of 
proceedings as a claimant, as well as after the other party has commenced proceedings 
as the defendant. For example, when the non-beneficiary of a unilateral arbitration 
agreement commences proceedings before a court, the beneficiary may rely on an 
arbitration option and request the court to refer the dispute to arbitration.15 Similarly, if 
the non-beneficiary of a unilateral litigation clause institutes arbitration, the beneficiary 
can exercise its litigation option and request the arbitral tribunal to refer the dispute to 
litigation.16 
 The attitude of European jurisdictions towards unilateral dispute resolution 
agreements varies significantly.17 Although courts in most states, including the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Greece and Belgium,18 uphold such clauses, 
they have been treated with greater hostility in recent years. Courts have employed 
different methods to invalidate unilateral dispute resolution agreements. In particular, 
French and Bulgarian courts have relied on mandatory provisions of their national 
contract law.19 The French Cour de Cassation invalidated a unilateral dispute resolution 
agreement because of its ‘potestative character’,20 while the Bulgarian Supreme Court 
of Cassation held that a similar clause was against ‘good morals’.21 
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16 See Debenture Trust Corp plc v Elektrim Finance BV and others [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 476 [493]. 
17 Clifford Chance, ‘Unilateral Option Clauses – 2017 Survey’ (Clifford Chance, 25 January 2017) 
<https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2017/01/unilateral_optionclauses-2017survey.html> 
accessed 15 May 2018, 3. 
18 ibid. 
19 French Civil Code (before 2016 reform), Article 1170; Bulgarian Contracts and Obligations Act, 
Article 26(1). 
20 Judgment of 26 September 2012, X v Banque Privée Edmond de Rothschild Europe, Cass. Civ. (1ère) 
(French Cour de Cassation). For comment see Maxi Scherer, ‘The French Rothschild Case: A Threat for 
Unilateral Dispute Resolution Clauses?’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 18 July 2013) 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2013/07/18/the-french-rothschild-case-a-threat-for-
unilateral-dispute-resolution-clauses/> accessed 15 May 2018. 
21 Judgment no 71 in commercial case no 1193/2010 (2 September 2011, Bulgarian Supreme Court of 
Cassation). For comment see Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Bulgarian Court Strikes Down One Way Jurisdiction 
Clause’ (Conflict of Laws net, 13 November 2012) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/bulgarian-court-
strikes-down-one-way-jurisdiction-clause/> accessed 15 May 2018. 
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Further, the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation invalidated a 
unilateral litigation agreement for ‘violating the balance of the parties’ rights’.22 In 
support of its position, the Russian court referred to Article 6 ECHR and the 
corresponding jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Although the way the Russian court applied 
the ECHR has been subject to criticism,23 neither case law nor commentary contains a 
detailed inquiry into its overall conclusion on the compatibility of unilateral option 
clauses with the ECHR.  
 The ECtHR has also not yet dealt with the issue; the only scholarship to date 
which examines unilateral option agreements in light of the ECHR is Van Zelst’s 
February 2018 article.24 Zelst’s analysis focuses on the validity of unilateral arbitration 
agreements under the ECHR. This paper takes a step further by analysing both unilateral 
arbitration and unilateral litigation clauses and by adopting a different approach to 
assessing their compatibility with the ECHR. Before articulating the approach, this 
article adopts, it is necessary to set out the principles on which it will be based. 
 
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNILATERAL OPTION CLAUSES AND 
THE ECHR 
An answer to the question whether unilateral option clauses are compatible with the 
ECHR is premised on the general principles of the interrelation between arbitration and 
the ECHR. This section aims to provide the background to these principles insofar as it 
is relevant to the assessment of unilateral option clauses. It firstly analyses how the 
court seised may characterise the question of unilateral option clauses’ compatibility 
with the ECHR. The section then determines the place of arbitration in the ECHR 
system and distinguishes two types of safeguards contained in Article 6 ECHR: those 
applicable before and after the initiation of the proceedings. It further explores how the 
                                                          
22 Russian Telephone Company CJSC v Sony-Ericsson Mobile Communications Rus LLC Case no BAC-
1831/12 (19 June 2012, Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation) (in Russian, translation by 
the author) <http://cisarbitration.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Sony-Ericsson-Resolution.pdf> 
accessed 15 May 2018, 7. For comment see Yelena E Archiyan, ‘Fate of the Unilateral Option Clause 
Finally Decided in Russia’ (NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, 10 April 2013) 
<http://nyujilp.org/fate-of-the-unilateral-option-clause-finally-decided-in-russia/#FN0> accessed 15 
May 2018. 
23 See Anton Asoskov, ‘Chapter 3: Unilateral Optional Dispute Resolution Clauses – From Russia with 
Prejudice’ in Bachir Georges Affaki and Horacio A Grigera Naón (eds), Jurisdictional Choices in Times 
of Trouble (International Chamber of Commerce 2015) 58; Draguiev (n 4) 35. 
24 Bas van Zelst, ‘Unilateral Option Arbitration Clauses: An Unequivocal Choice for Arbitration under 
the ECHR?’ (2018) 25 MJECL 77. 
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ECtHR treats traditional arbitration agreements and the extent that an arbitration 
agreement excludes the application of the ECHR’s guarantees. 
1. Characterisation of Unilateral Option Clauses’ Compatibility with the ECHR 
The characterisation of unilateral option clauses’ compatibility with the ECHR by a 
court is dependent on the circumstances in which it is raised. This issue can be invoked 
at the beginning of the proceedings, during a set-aside action, or at the award-
enforcement stage. 
 At the outset of a dispute, some of the common situations where a national court 
may be required to assess the compatibility of a unilateral option clause with the ECHR 
include the following: 
 the non-beneficiary of a unilateral litigation clause initiates litigation in breach 
of a clause, and the beneficiary requests under Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(hereafter, ‘NYC’) that the court refer the dispute to arbitration. At this point, 
Article II(3) NYC requires a national court to assess whether an arbitration 
agreement ‘is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’.25 
Although Article II(3) NYC is silent on the issue of applicable law, most 
authorities employ the rule enshrined in Article V(1)(a) NYC, which also 
applies to the recognition of arbitration agreements.26 Consequently, the 
arbitration clause is analysed ‘under the law to which the parties have subjected 
it’ or, if they failed to choose the law governing arbitration agreement, under 
the law of the seat.27 Hence, if the applicable law is that of an ECHR Contracting 
State, the court will examine whether a unilateral litigation clause is valid under 
the ECHR; 
 even if the law applicable to a unilateral litigation clause is a jurisdiction which 
is not an ECHR Contracting State, if the court seised is situated in a Contracting 
State, the agreement’s compatibility with the ECHR can be still relevant. A 
court might need to consider whether to decline jurisdiction on the basis of a 
unilateral litigation clause would amount to a violation of Article 6 ECHR and 
therefore its public policy. 
                                                          
25 NYC, Article II(3). 
26 For an overview of authorities and case law, see Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration 
(2nd ed, Kluwer Law International 2014) 496-99. 
27 NYC, Article V(1)(a). 
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Although Article II(3) NYC does not specify public policy as a ground for 
refusing a request for referral to arbitration, some authors maintain that Article 
V(2)(b) NYC, which allows non-enforcement of an award on the basis of public 
policy, can be applied by analogy to the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
under Article II(3) NYC.28 The rationale of the public policy consideration in 
relation to unilateral option clauses is that a national court, being an integral part 
of the state, is under an obligation to act in accordance with the ECHR.29 If it 
fails to do so, an individual can claim a violation of his rights before the 
ECtHR.30 Thus, a national court might need to determine whether to enforce a 
unilateral litigation clause would unjustifiably deprive an individual of a right 
to a court protected by the ECHR. To answer this question, a court will have to 
assess whether a unilateral litigation clause is valid under its national law, 
including the ECHR, irrespective of the law applicable to a unilateral litigation 
agreement. If a court concludes that the clause is invalid under the ECHR, the 
act of enforcing it by declining jurisdiction over the dispute will constitute a 
breach of the state’s obligation under the ECHR to guarantee each individual 
access to a court and will, therefore, contradict the state’s public policy; or 
 where the non-beneficiary of a unilateral arbitration clause initiates litigation, 
a beneficiary may rely on its arbitration option and ask the court to refer the 
dispute to arbitration. In this situation, the same considerations relating to the 
validity of a unilateral arbitration clause and public policy apply as in the fact 
patterns described above. 
 In the course of a set-aside action, a unilateral option clause’s compatibility with 
the ECHR might be raised: 
 under Article 34(2)(a) of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law’s Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration31 (hereafter, 
‘MAL’) as a matter of the arbitration agreement’s validity, in case the parties 
                                                          
28 Dorothee Schramm and Elliott Geisinger, ‘Article II’ in Herbert Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk 
Otto and Nicola Christine Port (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global 
Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International 2010) 105. 
29 Aleksandar Jaksic, ‘Procedural Guarantees of Human Rights in Arbitration Proceedings’ (2007) 24 
JIA 159, 162. 
30 James J Fawcett, ‘The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law’ (2007) 56 
ICLQ 1, 2. 
31 If a court deciding the case is in a MAL jurisdiction. 
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have subjected their unilateral option clause to the law of an ECHR Contracting 
State or if the seat of arbitration is in an ECHR Contracting State; or 
 under Article 34(2)(b)(ii) as a question of whether an award rendered on the 
basis of a unilateral option clause is in conflict with the public policy of the seat 
of arbitration. 
 At the stage of recognition and enforcement of an award issued under a 
unilateral option clause, an enforcing court might have to assess whether the agreement 
is compatible with the ECHR: 
 under Article V(1)(a) NYC when analysing the validity of an arbitration 
agreement, in case the parties have subjected their unilateral option clause to the 
law of an ECHR Contracting State or if the seat of arbitration was in an ECHR 
Contracting State; or 
 under Article V(2)(b) NYC when determining whether to enforce an award 
rendered on the basis of a unilateral option clause would amount to the violation 
of the public policy of a state. 
 Therefore, the question whether the ECHR precludes unilateral option clauses 
can be characterised by the court seised either as a matter of public policy or of the 
arbitration agreement’s validity. These notions can be invoked at the outset of arbitral 
proceedings, during a set-aside action or at the enforcement stage. Which of the two 
concepts will be employed is determined by the circumstances of the case — in 
particular, the law applicable to a unilateral option clause and the state in which the 
court seised is situated. Having established the situations where the parties might be 
able to question the validity of a unilateral option clause, the subsequent sections will 
explore the premises which can underpin their arguments. 
2. Relationship between Arbitration and the ECHR 
The discussion on the relationship between the ECHR and arbitration normally focuses 
on contrasting the two. The reason for this is that the main purpose of an arbitration 
agreement is to exclude the jurisdiction of national courts over any potential dispute 
between the parties.32 In contrast, the ECHR’s purpose is to establish the obligations of 
state organs, including courts, in the area of human rights protection.33 Hence, 
arbitration is viewed as an instrument for the partial exclusion of human rights 
                                                          
32 Born (n 26) 1270. 
33 Oliver Dörr, ‘European Convention on Human Rights’ in Stefanie Schmahl and Marten Breuer (eds), 
The Council of Europe: Its Law and Policies (Oxford University Press 2017) para 22(16). 
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guarantees relating to a fair trial contained in Article 6 ECHR. Although the ECHR’s 
case law suggests that the above view is largely true,34 arbitration can also be viewed 
as a way of achieving some of the ECHR’s objectives. 
 There are two principles in the ECHR’s system relevant to determine the 
interrelation between the ECHR and arbitration: access to justice and access to a court.  
 Access to justice is not explicitly mentioned in the ECHR,35 or in any other 
international human rights instrument.36 It is therefore a descriptive rather than a legal 
notion.37 Access to justice is normally interpreted to encompass Article 6 ECHR (a right 
to a fair trial) and Article 13 ECHR (a right to an effective remedy).38 Hence, access to 
justice is a broader concept than access to a court.39 Access to justice denotes the ability 
of a party to seek and obtain a remedy for a violation of his rights through either formal 
or informal institutions.40 Arbitration constitutes one of the means to access justice.41 
Thus, even though by entering into an arbitration agreement the parties waive certain 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR, arbitration should not be perceived as being detached 
from the ECHR’s system. It plays a role in furthering the ECHR’s objectives by 
providing individuals with a special mechanism to obtain a remedy for the violation of 
their rights.  
 Arbitration is more commonly discussed in the context of Article 6 ECHR, and 
whether and to what extent the guarantees established under the provision apply to 
arbitral proceedings. Article 6 ECHR protects the right to a fair trial, which contains 
                                                          
34 See the detailed discussion in the subsequent section C(3). 
35 Janneke H Gerards and Lize R Glas, ‘Access to Justice in the European Convention on Human Rights 
System’ (2017) 25 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 11, 13; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Access to Justice in Europe: an Overview of Challenges and Opportunities 
(Publications Office of the EU 2011) 14. 
36 Council of Europe Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination, Equality and Non-Discrimination 
in the Access to Justice Report (31 March 2015) <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=21619&lang=en> accessed 17 March 2019 para 6. 
37 ibid. 
38 Gerards and Glas (n 35) 15; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European 
Law Relating to Access to Justice (Publications Office of the EU 2016) 16; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Access to Justice in Europe: an Overview of Challenges and Opportunities (n 35) 
14; Council of Europe Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination (n 36) para 1. 
39 Gerards and Glas (n 35) 15. 
40 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Programming for Justice: Access for All: A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Human Rights-Based Approach to Access to Justice’ (United Nations Development Programme 
2005) <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Justice_Guides_ProgrammingForJustice-AccessForAll.pdf> 
accessed 17 March 2019 5. 
41 Lithgow and others v United Kingdom App no 9006/80 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) [201] cited in Stephan 
W Schill, ‘Developing a Framework for the Legitimacy of International Arbitration’ in Albert Jan van 
den Berg (ed), Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges (Kluwer Law International 2015) 825; European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European Law Relating to Access to Justice (n 38) 
48. 
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several guarantees, either expressly articulated in the ECHR or developed by the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence.42 The most relevant part of Article 6 ECHR reads as follows: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations (…) everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly 
(…).43 
 For the purposes of this article, the safeguards of Article 6 ECHR can be divided 
into two groups; those applicable before and after the initiation of the proceedings. The 
former safeguards are relevant to determining the validity of an arbitration agreement 
or a unilateral option clause, whereas the latter are material for assessing the legality of 
an arbitral procedure. 
 Before an action is brought, Article 6 ECHR protects the right of access to a 
court, which the ECtHR defines as the right to initiate proceedings before a state court.44 
Although it does not contain express language to that effect, the ECtHR held in Golder 
v United Kingdom that the right of access is inherent in Article 6 and rejected the 
argument that Article 6 is only applicable to an action that has already been initiated.45 
The ECtHR reasoned that it would be irrational to establish extensive procedural 
guarantees for pending litigation, without first securing an ability to initiate the 
proceedings.46 
 With respect to an instituted action, Article 6 ECHR contains requirements 
applicable to the conduct of the proceedings and the composition of a court. The range 
of guarantees available in this category are considerably wider than those before the 
initiation of proceedings. The safeguards of this group include the principles of equality 
of arms, adversarial proceedings, and public hearing; the rights to be present at the 
hearing and to a trial within reasonable time; and the independence and impartiality of 
a judge.47  
 To sum up, arbitration can be seen both as a way to partially exclude the 
application of guarantees contained in Article 6 ECHR and a means to ensure access to 
justice for an individual as required by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. Article 6 ECHR 
                                                          
42 See Golder v the United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975) [36]. 
43 ECHR Article 6(1). 
44 Golder (n 42) [36]. 
45 ibid [35]. 
46 ibid [35]. 
47 See William Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 288. 
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provides the parties to a dispute with rights applicable not only after the institution of 
the proceedings but also before a claim is brought. Only the latter category of 
safeguards is relevant for assessing the compatibility of unilateral option clauses with 
the ECHR because such agreements affect the position of the parties before an action 
is instituted, rather than within an already initiated procedure. Before moving on to 
determine the guarantees of Article 6 ECHR affected by unilateral option clauses, it is 
instructive to first explore the impact of a traditional arbitration agreement on the same 
provision.   
3. Waiver of Guarantees Contained in Article 6 ECHR 
By entering into an arbitration agreement, the parties undertake an obligation not to 
bring their claims before a national court.48 It follows that this arrangement runs 
contrary to a right of access to a court protected under Article 6 ECHR. However, the 
ECtHR considers an arbitration agreement to be a valid waiver of this right,49 provided 
that it satisfies certain requirements.50 At the same time, arbitration cannot entail a 
complete renunciation of all safeguards contained in Article 6 ECHR. This has been 
consistently confirmed by the European Commission and the ECtHR in their 
jurisprudence. 
 The European Commission in X v Federal Republic of Germany held that the 
ECHR does not prohibit ‘partial renunciation’ of rights contained in Article 6 ECHR.51 
It found that an arbitration agreement constitutes a partial renunciation of Article 6 
ECHR.52 The European Commission focused on rights of Article 6 ECHR applicable 
after a procedure is initiated and failed to mention the right of access to a court. This is 
unsurprising since the judgment in X v Federal Republic of Germany was rendered in 
1962, whereas the right of access to a court was recognised by the ECtHR for the first 
time only in Golder, in 1975.53 Nevertheless, these decisions read together necessarily 
imply that traditional arbitration clauses constitute a valid waiver of the right of access 
to a court protected under Article 6 ECHR. 
                                                          
48 Born (n 26) 1270. 
49 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (6th edn, OUP 2015) 589. 
50 See section F below for the detailed discussion of the requirements. 
51 X v Federal Republic of Germany App no 1197/61 (Commission Decision, 5 March 1962). 
52 ibid. 
53 Golder (n 42). 
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 Another judgment which illustrates a positive attitude of the ECtHR towards 
arbitration agreements is Deweer v Belgium.54 Although the case concerned issues of 
criminal law, the judgment contains important insight into the ECtHR’s view on 
arbitration. The ECtHR noted that a waiver of rights contained in Article 6 ECHR is 
often encountered ‘in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts’.55 The ECtHR 
outlined two characteristics of such a waiver. First, it does not violate the ECHR ‘in 
principle’.56 By employing this wording, the ECtHR made clear that not every 
arbitration agreement can be considered a valid waiver of Article 6 ECHR. Second, the 
ECtHR assumed that a waiver in the form of an arbitration clause has ‘undeniable 
advantages for the individual’.57 When taking this position, the ECtHR most probably 
had in mind traditional arbitration agreements where both parties are obliged to refer 
potential disputes to arbitration. It is questionable whether the ECtHR would express 
the same attitude towards unilateral option clauses. In light of court decisions in various 
jurisdictions invalidating unilateral option clauses on the grounds of their prejudice 
towards one of the parties,58 describing these agreements as undeniably advantageous 
for both parties appears to be unconvincing. 
 In Suovaniemi and others v Finland, the ECtHR reiterated that an arbitration 
agreement does not per se contradict Article 6 ECHR and is ‘in principle acceptable’.59 
At the same time, this does not mean that an arbitration clause waives all of rights 
contained in Article 6.60 The ECtHR further reasoned that since Article 6 ECHR 
guarantees a wide range of rights, the permissibility of a waiver in respect of each one 
of them may have to be assessed independently: 
Waiver may be permissible with regard to certain rights but not with regard to 
certain others. A distinction may have to be made even between different rights 
guaranteed by Article 6.61 
 In other words, the ECtHR implies that an arbitration agreement, apart from 
being a renunciation of the right of access to a court, can be considered an automatic, 
valid waiver of certain procedural safeguards contained in Article 6 ECHR. At the same 
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time, other guarantees under Article 6 merit separate assessment of the permissibility 
of waiving them. 
 The most obvious example of a safeguard that an arbitration agreement waives 
together with the right of access to a court is an entitlement to a public hearing,62 which 
the ECtHR has expressly recognised.63 This is implicated in the very nature of 
arbitration, where confidentiality of proceedings is one of its primary features.64 
Arguably, another automatically waivable guarantee is the right to a decision ‘within a 
reasonable time’, since neither a national court nor the ECtHR is legally or practically 
capable of controlling the duration of arbitral proceedings.65 On the other hand, 
authorities generally agree that the right to a fair and equal treatment and the right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal cannot be waived by the mere signing of an 
arbitration clause.66 However, in light of scarce guidance from the ECtHR, the situation 
becomes ambiguous with respect to specific arbitral practices which are potentially at 
odds with Article 6 ECHR. Benedettelli points to a number of features of arbitration 
which may be incompatible with Article 6 ECHR including, inter alia, the exclusion of 
a party representative appointed after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal if the 
appointment may jeopardise the independence and impartiality of arbitrators;67 the 
procedure for the appointment of an arbitrator in multi-party proceedings which does 
not ensure equality between parties;  the lack of remedies against decisions of arbitral 
institutions on arbitrator challenges; and the limited requirements for a reasoned 
decision in an arbitral award.68 The issue is then whether and to what extent Article 6 
ECHR precludes similar practices and whether a party to an arbitration agreement can 
resist them by invoking the ECHR.  
 A detailed inquiry into the compatibility of certain arbitral practices with Article 
6 ECHR is outside the scope of the present article. What is important for the purposes 
                                                          
62 Blackaby (n 49) 589. 
63 Nordström v the Netherlands App no 28101/95 (ECtHR, 27 November 1996). 
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of this research is that by agreeing to an arbitration agreement, parties exclude the 
applicability of certain safeguards contained in Article 6 ECHR or at least limit the level 
of protection afforded by them. 
4. Summary 
The purpose of this section was to establish a number of principles which govern the 
interrelation between the ECHR and arbitration which are relevant to assessing the 
compatibility of unilateral option clauses with the ECHR. First, an arbitration 
agreement constitutes a valid waiver of the right of access to a court under Article 6 
ECHR. Second, the fact that an arbitration agreement waives the right of access to a 
court does not entail that other guarantees under Article 6 ECHR are also waived. Third, 
an arbitration agreement limits the level of protection under Article 6 ECHR. Some 
features of arbitration entail an automatic waiver of certain rights under Article 6 
ECHR. For example, the ECtHR has decided that the confidentiality of arbitration 
implies the waiver of the right to a public hearing. Since the ECtHR has not provided 
guidance on how to distinguish waivable and non-waivable guarantees, the 
compatibility of other arbitral practices with the ECHR is unclear. 
 The ECtHR has not had an opportunity to render a judgment in respect of 
unilateral option clauses. Since they are special types of arbitration agreements, their 
effect on Article 6 ECHR guarantees is not identical to traditional arbitration clauses. 
Hence, before assessing the compatibility of unilateral option clauses with Article 6 
ECHR, it is necessary to establish which right, apart from the right of access to a court, 
is triggered by these agreements. The subsequent section aims to do this by considering 
the decisions of courts in two jurisdictions with conflicting perspectives on the issue. 
 
D. PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 6 ECHR AFFECTED BY UNILATERAL 
OPTION CLAUSES 
This section looks at different approaches to the application of Article 6 ECHR to 
dispute resolution clauses. It first considers the application of Article 6 ECHR to a 
unilateral litigation clause by the Russian court, which sparked a discussion on the 
compatibility of unilateral option clauses with the ECHR. The section then analyses a 
decision rendered by the English High Court on a choice of court agreement. Although 
the English case did not involve arbitration, the court’s reasoning indicates that Article 
6 ECHR can be applied to unilateral option clauses in the form of the right of equal 
access to a court. 
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1. Unilateral Litigation Clause Invalidated by the Russian Court 
In 2012, the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation 
applied the principle of equality of arms contained in Article 6 ECHR to a unilateral 
litigation clause and declared it invalid.69 This approach cannot be sustained since, as 
discussed in section C(2), the equality of arms is relevant only to the position of the 
parties within an already initiated procedure. 
 The dispute before the Russian court arose out of a mobile phone supply 
agreement between Sony-Ericsson Mobile Communications Rus LLC and Russian 
Telephone Company CJSC (hereafter, ‘Sony Ericsson case’). The contract contained a 
dispute resolution provision where both parties agreed to arbitrate, but Sony Ericsson 
retained the right of access to a court: 
Any dispute arising out of this Contract which cannot be settled by negotiations 
will be finally resolved in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three (3) arbitrators 
appointed in accordance with the Rules (…). This arbitration clause shall not 
restrict Sony Ericsson to seek the collection of debt for the delivered goods 
through a competent state court.70 
 The Russian court reasoned that this unilateral litigation agreement was 
contrary to ‘the fundamental principles of protection of civil rights’ and decided that 
the clause was void as it ‘violates the balance of the parties’ rights’.71 In support of its 
conclusion, the Russian court referred to the principle of equality of arms contained in 
Article 6 ECHR. It stated that according to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence the parties must 
possess equal procedural opportunities,72 and emphasised that the ECHR guarantees the 
right of a party to be in an equal position in relation to its opponent.73 On this basis, the 
Russian court concluded that a dispute resolution clause cannot provide only one party 
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with the right of access to a court while depriving the other one of the same 
opportunity.74 
 Commentators criticise the application of the ECHR by the Russian court in the 
Sony Ericsson case.75 The first ground is that ECtHR cases mentioned in the judgment 
concern legal issues and factual circumstances completely unconnected with arbitration 
or contract law.76 Another more substantive ground relates to the misinterpretation of 
the principle of equality of arms guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR. As demonstrated in 
section C(2), this concept is only relevant to procedure that has already been initiated. 
Since an unequal power to choose a forum has no bearing on the position of the parties 
within proceedings, the principle of equality of arms is not applicable to dispute 
resolution clauses.77 
 To sum up, the Russian court incorrectly applied Article 6 ECHR to a unilateral 
arbitration clause in the Sony Ericsson case. Unilateral option clauses determine rights 
and obligations of the parties before they begin the dispute resolution process. In 
contrast, the principle of equality of arms under Article 6 ECHR is only applicable to 
an already initiated procedure. 
2. The English Court’s Application of Article 6 ECHR to a Choice of Court 
Agreement 
In 2013, the English High Court applied the principle of equal access to justice under 
Article 6 ECHR to a choice of court agreement but found that the clause at issue did 
not violate the ECHR. Despite the fact that the case concerned a dispute resolution 
agreement without an arbitration element, it is still valuable for the present analysis. 
The decision of the English court demonstrates that Article 6 ECHR does contain 
safeguards which can be applied to unilateral option clauses. At the same time, the 
whole analysis and conclusion cannot be easily transferred to unilateral option clauses. 
Since the English case concerned a choice of court agreement, it did not involve a 
waiver of the right of access to a court by one of the parties. When viewed through the 
lenses of the ECHR, this distinction has important implications, to be discussed in detail 
in section E. 
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 The dispute before the English court arose out of a facility agreement between 
Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd and Hestia Holdings Limited, with Sujana Universal 
Industries Limited as guarantor of Hestia's obligations (hereafter, ‘Mauritius case’).78 
The contract contained a choice of court agreement pursuant to which Mauritius was 
allowed to bring claims anywhere in the world, while Hestia could initiate the 
proceedings only in England: 
‘Clause 24.1 [Jurisdiction] 
(a) The courts of England have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute 
arising out of or in connection with this Agreement (including a dispute 
regarding the existence, validity or termination of this Agreement) (a 
‘Dispute’). 
(…) 
(c) This Clause 24.1 is for the benefit of the Lender only. As a result, the Lender 
shall not be prevented from taking proceedings related to a Dispute in any 
other courts in any jurisdiction. To the extent allowed by law the Lender 
may take concurrent proceedings in any number of jurisdictions.’79 
 Hestia argued that this clause was incompatible with the principle of equal 
access to justice enshrined in Article 6 ECHR.80 The English court rejected the 
contention by stating obiter that ‘[A]rticle 6 is directed to access to justice within the 
forum chosen by the parties, not to choice of forum’.81 Draguiev interprets this passage 
from the Mauritius case as suggesting that the principle of equality is probably not 
applicable to unilateral option clauses at all, since ‘they only influence the designation 
of jurisdiction and not the development of the proceedings’.82 However, the further 
reasoning of the English court does not support such a proposition. The English court 
stated that Hestia failed to identify the forum where its access to justice would be 
unequal as compared to Mauritius’s because of the latter’s power of choice.83 In other 
words, the English court found that the broader number of jurisdictions available to the 
beneficiary does not mean that an opposing party has less access to a court compared 
                                                          
78 Mauritius Commercial Bank Limited v Hestia Holdings Limited and Sujana Universal Industries 
Limited [2013] EWHC 1328 (Comm). 
79 ibid [10]. 
80 ibid [12]. 
81 ibid [43]. 
82 Draguiev (n 4) 35. 
83 Mauritius (n 78) [43]. 
18 
to the beneficiary.84 It follows that a dispute resolution agreement is compatible with 
Article 6 ECHR if the parties are equally placed in relation to the courts of at least one 
jurisdiction. Hypothetically, there could have been an agreement that would create 
unequal access to the courts of England for Hestia as compared to Mauritius. Hence, 
rather than rejecting the application of the principle of equal access, the English court 
found that Hestia failed to prove that the agreement under consideration affected its 
right of equal access to a court. 
 A comparison between the Sony Ericsson case and the Mauritius case highlights 
the logic of the English court’s reasoning. Unlike the Russian court, which mistakenly 
based its decision on the equality of arms aspect of Article 6 ECHR, the English court 
analysed the choice of court agreement from the perspective of the article’s guarantee 
of equal access to a court. Hence, the English court did not deal with the equality of the 
parties in the same way as the Russian court did. In fact, having analysed the dispute 
resolution clause in light of the equal access to a court, the English court remedied the 
awkward argumentation of the Russian court by confirming that the principle of 
equality of the parties does matter before a procedure is initiated. 
3. Summary 
Neither the Sony Ericsson case nor the Mauritius case adequately answers the question 
whether unilateral option clauses comply with Article 6 ECHR. However, the analysis 
of these decisions provides guidance which is useful in constructing a framework for 
finding a solution to the compatibility issue. First, the principle of equality of arms 
enshrined in Article 6 ECHR cannot be applied to unilateral option clauses. Second, the 
equality of the parties is still relevant to unilateral option clauses in the form of the right 
of equal access to a court. 
 
E. UNILATERAL OPTION CLAUSES AS A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT 
OF EQUAL ACCESS TO A COURT UNDER ARTICLE 6 ECHR 
The next section demonstrates how unilateral option clauses affect guarantees of Article 
6 ECHR applicable before the initiation of the proceedings, namely the right to a court 
and the right of equal access to a court. It first defines the content of the right of equal 
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access to a court and explains why it is relevant to assessing the compatibility of 
unilateral option agreements with Article 6 ECHR. The section further distinguishes 
between the effects of unilateral litigation and arbitration clauses on Article 6 ECHR 
generally and the right of equal access to a court in particular. It argues that a unilateral 
litigation clause entails a waiver of both the right of access to a court and the right of 
equal access to a court by the non-beneficiary, whereas a unilateral arbitration 
agreement results only in a waiver of the right of equal access to a court. However, this 
does not automatically mean that Article 6 ECHR precludes unilateral option clauses. 
Whether such agreements can be valid waivers of the right of equal access to a court 
and thus compatible with Article 6 ECHR is investigated in section F. 
1. Right of Equal Access to a Court and its Bearing Upon Unilateral Option 
Clauses 
The right of equal access to a court is neither explicitly mentioned in Article 6 ECHR 
nor yet articulated by the ECtHR. Nevertheless, international human rights law clearly 
recognises the concept.85 As discussed above, the English court in the Mauritius case 
considered the right of equal access to a court a part of Article 6 ECHR.86 Since the 
ECtHR interprets the ECHR in light of other international instruments and the practice 
of European states,87 it can be reasonably argued that Article 6 ECHR does protect the 
equality of access to a court. Human rights law traditionally interprets this guarantee as 
requiring positive actions by states to ensure that there exists, inter alia, a proper 
judicial system covering the whole territory of a state and a possibility to obtain legal 
aid.88 At the same time, it also makes sure that there is no legal impediment to accessing 
a court.89 The requirement implies the necessity for the absence in national legislation 
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of provisions restricting access to a court for a certain group of individuals.90 However, 
the decision of the English court in the Mauritius case demonstrates that Article 6 
ECHR can also be applied to obstacles generated by private law instruments, 
particularly dispute resolution agreements. Hence, the right of equal access to a court 
requires that there should be no impediments, including legal ones, which put an 
individual in a disadvantageous position compared to others with respect to their right 
of access to a court. 
 In the only piece of available scholarship inquiring into the compatibility of 
unilateral option clauses with the ECHR, Zelst analyses unilateral arbitration clauses 
solely in terms of a waiver of the right of access to a court.91 His approach, however, 
disregards the peculiarities of unilateral option clauses compared to regular arbitration 
agreements. If viewed merely from the perspective of the right of access to a court, 
there is no difference between the two. Both traditional arbitration agreements and 
unilateral option clauses limit the ability of at least one party to access a court, but the 
problem with the latter is that they affect the equality between the parties in accessing 
a court. Moreover, it is questionable to what extent a mere signing of a unilateral 
arbitration clause can be considered a waiver of the right of access to a court, since it 
allows both parties to initiate litigation.92 For these reasons, the present article assesses 
the compatibility of unilateral option clauses with the ECHR in light of the right of 
equal access to a court. 
 From the perspective of the right of equal access to a court, the problem with 
unilateral option clauses consists not, as it was in the Mauritius case, in a broader range 
of options available to the beneficiary for bringing its claim before a decision maker. In 
Golder v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR reasoned that the right of access to a court is 
a safeguard which makes it possible to benefit from the procedural guarantees of Article 
6 ECHR.93 Hence, the problem is that a unilateral option clause places the parties in a 
different position with regards to access to a procedure, namely litigation, which ought 
to entirely satisfy standards contained in Article 6 ECHR. As demonstrated in section 
C(3), arbitral proceedings are not fully compliant with the requirements of Article 6 
ECHR. Additionally, some procedural tools, such as pre-trial discovery or joinder,94 
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and remedies, such as the contempt power,95 are only available in litigation. It is true 
that arbitration may be praised as a more effective and thus practically a more beneficial 
dispute resolution method than litigation. Although this argument might be valid for 
assessing whether unilateral option clauses can be considered a legitimate waiver of the 
right of equal access to a court (see section F), it is irrelevant to the present stage of 
analysis. At this point, it is important that under Article 6 ECHR each individual must 
possess equal access to litigation with corresponding procedural guarantees. Unilateral 
option clauses run contrary to this requirement. 
2. Unilateral Litigation Clause v Unilateral Arbitration Clause: Effects on 
Article 6 ECHR Distinguished 
Unilateral arbitration and unilateral litigation agreements are not identical in their 
effects on the right of access to a court and the right of equal access to a court. The first 
difference is that a unilateral litigation clause constitutes a waiver of both of these rights 
by the non-beneficiary, whereas a unilateral arbitration clause waives only the right of 
equal access to a court. The second distinction lies in the different ways these 
agreements influence the equality of access to a court. 
 A unilateral litigation clause entails a waiver by the non-beneficiary of both the 
right of access to a court and the right of equal access to a court. After the agreement is 
signed, the non-beneficiary can no longer bring its claim to a court, while the 
beneficiary retains this option. Thus, the non-beneficiary, in addition to waiving the 
right of access to a court, also relinquishes its right of equal access to a court vis-à-vis 
the beneficiary of a unilateral litigation clause. This means that the non-beneficiary will 
not be able to have its claim determined in litigation under all of the guarantees provided 
for in Article 6 ECHR. At the same time, the beneficiary, which has the power to choose 
either arbitration or proceedings before a national court, retains the ability to potentially 
benefit from the full range of Article 6 ECHR safeguards in the proceedings, where the 
claim it brings will be decided. The beneficiary also retains an ability to employ 
procedural tools which are either available exclusively in litigation or are most effective 
when ordered by a court. For example, where the circumstances of a dispute suggest 
that a successful claim will require the extensive taking of evidence from third parties, 
the beneficiary would likely opt for litigation, as in arbitration this tool is either limited 
or unavailable, depending on the law applicable to arbitration proceedings. In contrast, 
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the non-beneficiary does not have a similar advantage, which can sometimes mean that 
the prospects of proving a particular allegation are so minimal that bringing a claim is 
futile. 
 The situation is different where a traditional arbitration agreement is engaged. 
In this case, both parties waive their right to a court by undertaking an obligation not to 
initiate litigation, which means that their access to a court is equal. On the contrary, a 
unilateral litigation clause creates a situation where the non-beneficiary is completely 
precluded from initiating litigation, while the beneficiary is entirely free to do so. 
Hence, these agreements result in a waiver by the non-beneficiary of the right of access 
to a court together with the right of equal access to a court.  
 By entering into a unilateral arbitration clause, the non-beneficiary waives its 
right of equal access to a court without waiving the right of access to a court. Since both 
parties can initiate litigation, and the ECtHR defines the right of access to a court as 
‘the right to institute proceedings’,96 the non-beneficiary retains the right of access to a 
court even after a unilateral arbitration clause is signed. However, even though the non-
beneficiary can institute proceedings before a court, this does not guarantee that the 
dispute will proceed in litigation; the beneficiary can block an action by exercising its 
arbitration option. It follows that although under a unilateral arbitration agreement both 
parties retain an ability to initiate litigation, the beneficiary can trump the non-
beneficiary’s access to a court. This results in the situation where the non-beneficiary’s 
access to a court is completely dependent on the will of another party. For this reason, 
a unilateral arbitration clause results in the renunciation of the right of equal access to 
a court by the non-beneficiary. 
 Therefore, in practical terms there is no significant difference between a 
unilateral arbitration and a unilateral litigation clause for the non-beneficiary. Either 
way the final choice as to the forum rests with the beneficiary. Even though from a legal 
standpoint a unilateral arbitration clause provides the non-beneficiary a wider scope of 
rights under the ECHR, there is a little benefit in being able to institute litigation without 
also having a chance to obtain a judgment from a court. 
 The counterargument to the proposition that under unilateral option clauses the 
parties have unequal access to the safeguards contained in Article 6 ECHR might be 
that this inequality is merely potential and is remedied at the very moment one party 
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initiates proceedings. For example, where the beneficiary of a unilateral litigation 
clause institutes proceedings in the court of an ECHR Contracting State, the non-
beneficiary will still enjoy the same protection under the ECHR as the beneficiary. 
When the beneficiary brings a claim in arbitration, both parties will also enjoy equally 
limited protection under the ECHR. Similarly, although the beneficiary of a unilateral 
arbitration clause can preclude litigation initiated by the non-beneficiary, later both 
parties will be in the same arbitration proceedings which provide them with equal 
protection. However, such a proposition disregards the fact that Article 6 ECHR 
contains two requirements relating to the equality of the parties: (1) equality within a 
procedure in the form of the equality of arms and (2) equality before a procedure is 
initiated in the form of equal access to a court. Although unilateral option clauses do 
not have implications for the first safeguard, they affect the latter. 
3. Summary 
Unilateral arbitration and unilateral litigation clauses affect the guarantees of Article 6 
ECHR differently. A unilateral litigation clause constitutes a waiver by the non-
beneficiary of both the right of access to a court and the right of equal access to a court. 
Once the non-beneficiary signs a unilateral litigation clause, it is completely precluded 
from initiating litigation, whereas the beneficiary reserves this ability. In contrast, a 
unilateral arbitration clause allows the non-beneficiary to institute litigation, but the 
beneficiary retains the right to ask a court to refer the parties to arbitration. Hence, a 
unilateral arbitration clause constitutes a waiver by the non-beneficiary of only the right 
of equal access to a court. The last step to determine compatibility or otherwise of 
unilateral option clauses with the ECHR is to establish whether Article 6 ECHR allows 
the waiver of the right of equal access to a court by means of unilateral option clauses. 
 
F. LEGALITY OF THE WAIVER OF THE RIGHT OF EQUAL ACCESS 
TO A COURT 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence has developed several requirements which must be 
satisfied for an advance waiver of a right guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR to be valid. In 
particular, the waiver must be a permissible waiver, agreed by a party of its own free 
will, expressed in an unequivocal manner, and accompanied by ‘minimum guarantees’ 
commensurate with the importance of the right waived. This section analyses whether 
the waiver of the right of equal access to a court by means of unilateral option clauses 
satisfies these conditions. 
24 
1. Permissibility of the Waiver 
As a preliminary matter, it must be established that the ECHR permits a waiver of a 
particular right. In Albert and Le Compte v Belgium the ECtHR stated that some of the 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR are so fundamental and important that no one can be 
deprived of their benefit, even if a person acts entirely voluntarily and absent coercion.97 
The ECtHR has not yet clearly distinguished waivable and non-waivable rights.98 
Moreover, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has not developed a test to differentiate 
between the two. The only guidance is that a waiver of a right is not permissible if the 
letter or the spirit of the ECHR prohibits a waiver.99 
 In light of the lack of detailed criteria, the permissibility of the waiver of the 
right of equal access to a court can be assessed through comparison with other 
guarantees of Article 6 ECHR, namely, rights whose waivability were examined by 
either the ECtHR or commentators.  
 One the one hand, the right of equal access to a court is closely linked to the 
right of equal treatment. Both are the manifestations of the principle of equality; the 
first safeguards equality between the parties before the initiation of proceedings, 
whereas the second one guarantees equality after an action is brought. Although the 
ECtHR has not yet addressed the question of whether the right of equal treatment can 
be waived, authors generally agree that it is a non-waivable guarantee.100 It can 
therefore be argued that since equality within a procedure cannot be waived, the same 
should be true for equality before an action is instituted. Such reasoning warrants the 
conclusion that the ECHR does not permit the waiver of the right of equal access to a 
court.  
 On the other hand, the right of equal access to a court constitutes a guarantee 
that is derivative from the right of access to a court. As demonstrated in section C(3), 
the right of access to a court can be validly waived by an arbitration agreement. A 
unilateral option clause is a special type of arbitration agreement. Its legal consequences 
are not identical but are quite similar to a traditional arbitration agreement. On this 
basis, an argument can be advanced that the waiver of the right of equal access to a 
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court is also permissible. Moreover, the waiver of the right of equal access to a court 
might be regarded as less onerous for a party compared to the waiver of the right to a 
court. In the latter situation, a party is completely precluded from access to a court. In 
contrast, by waiving the right of equal access to a court, a party merely makes its access 
to a court more difficult. In particular, upon entering into a unilateral arbitration clause, 
a party consents to an arrangement where its access to a court will be conditional on the 
will of the other party. Hence, it would be inconsistent to allow a waiver which has 
more significant implications for an individual, while prohibiting a less onerous one. 
 The second line of reasoning seems more convincing. As a response to the 
argument comparing the equality of arms and the right of equal access to a court, it 
should be noted that these guarantees are not of the same importance. The ECtHR’s 
reasoning in Golder v the United Kingdom implies that the right of access to a court is 
not a value in itself, but rather is a safeguard which makes it possible to benefit from 
the procedural guarantees of Article 6 ECHR.101 Unlike the principle of equality of 
arms, which protects the ability of a party to present its arguments and therefore directly 
affects the outcome of a case, the right of equal access to a court has much less influence 
on a final determination of the parties’ rights and obligations. It would follow that 
equality before the initiation of proceedings cannot be placed on the same level with 
equality within a procedure. Hence, the fact that the right of equal treatment cannot be 
waived does not necessarily entail that the same applies to the right of equal access to 
a court. 
 To sum up, the ECtHR’s case law neither definitely answers the question 
whether the right of equal access to a court is permissible, nor does it provide adequate 
guidance on the issue. Nevertheless, there are several points suggesting that this 
question should be answered in the affirmative. First, the right of equal access to a court 
constitutes an element of the right of access to a court, which may be waived by the 
parties as the ECtHR has clearly established. Second, the waiver of the right of equal 
access to a court is less onerous for an individual than the waiver of the right to a court. 
Hence, it would be more consistent to view the right of equal access to a court as a 
waivable guarantee of Article 6 ECHR, rather than a non-waivable one. 
2. Absence of Constraint 
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The ECtHR’s jurisprudence has clearly established that a valid waiver of a right shall 
be agreed by a party ‘of his own free will’.102 In Deweer v Belgium, the ECtHR 
stipulated that for a valid waiver of the right of access to a court ‘absence of constraint 
is at all events one of the conditions to be satisfied’.103 Although the case law indicates 
that ‘any form of constraint must be absent’,104 economic duress does not necessarily 
entail that a waiver is involuntary.105 At the same time, together with voluntariness, the 
ECtHR requires that a waiver of a right is knowing and intelligent.106 
 Smit argues that the only situation where a party would agree to a unilateral 
option clause is where it is acting under economic compulsion or does not fully 
comprehend the disadvantageous position it is entering into.107 Although these 
considerations might be relevant in cases involving consumers, it would be difficult to 
defend this position where a unilateral option clause is concluded between commercial 
parties. 
 First, it appears from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence that a situation where one party 
to a contract makes its conclusion conditional upon the inclusion of a unilateral option 
clause cannot be considered economic duress capable of invalidating the agreement. In 
Axelsson v Sweden, the owners of the taxi company argued that an arbitration clause 
contained in the membership agreement with a taxi association violated their right of 
access to a court.108 The ECtHR did not find a violation, although the applicants claimed 
it was ‘economically essential to join’ the association.109 Second, it would be 
unreasonable to assume that a commercial party, as opposed to a consumer, is not aware 
of the consequences a unilateral option clause entails since a contract between 
businesses is usually a product of lengthy negotiations involving lawyers. The more 
realistic approach is that the agreement is a result of bargaining and the non-beneficiary 
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of a unilateral option clause accepts its disadvantage in exchange for some benefit under 
the contract. 
 Therefore, unless the conclusion of a unilateral option clause involved 
extraordinary circumstances such as duress, the waiver of the right of equal access to a 
court by a unilateral option clause satisfies the absence of constraint requirement.  
3. Unequivocal Manner 
Another criterion of a valid waiver of a right is that it ‘must be established in an 
unequivocal manner’.110  The ECtHR’s jurisprudence does not contain a clear definition 
of what constitutes ‘unequivocal manner’. The ordinary meaning of ‘unequivocal’ is 
‘expressed in a clear and certain way’.111 
 Generally, this requirement does not mean that a waiver of a right shall be 
manifested in a written form. It can be demonstrated ‘either expressly or tacitly’.112 
However, the circumstances in which the ECtHR permits a tacit waiver concern cases 
where the question was whether the conduct of an individual within a procedure 
indicated a waiver of a right.113 Moreover, these cases dealt exclusively with a right to 
a public hearing.114 With respect to other rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the ECtHR 
has observed that ‘the waiver of a right, even the mere right to a sum of money, must 
result from unequivocal statements or documents’.115 Also, in connection with the right 
of access to a court, commentators argue that given its importance and the fact that the 
NYC requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing, it is logical to presume that the 
waiver of the right has to be made in writing.116 There are no reasons why this should 
be different for the right of equal access to a court.  
 Therefore, with respect to the renunciation of the right of equal access to a court 
in the form of unilateral option clauses, the requirement of a waiver being express in an 
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unequivocal manner includes the need for writing. A unilateral option clause satisfies 
this requirement unless it is drafted in unclear language. 
4. Appropriate Safeguards to the Waiver 
The ECtHR also requires that a waiver of a right is accompanied by ‘minimum 
guarantees commensurate with its importance’.117 In the context of arbitration, the 
ECtHR has specified this requirement in two cases.118 In Suovaniemi, when considering 
a waiver of the right to challenge an arbitrator for the lack of impartiality, the ECtHR 
indicated two circumstances to explain why the waiver was accompanied by ‘minimum 
safeguards’: (1) despite being aware of grounds for challenging the arbitrator, the 
applicant approved him; and (2) the applicant was represented by a lawyer during 
arbitral proceedings.119 
 When assessing the validity of the waiver of the right of equal access to a court, 
it should be reiterated that the ECtHR’s reasoning in Golder demonstrates that the right 
of access to a court is not a value in itself, but rather a safeguard which makes it possible 
to benefit from the procedural guarantees of Article 6 ECHR.120 If applied to unilateral 
option clauses, this logic suggests that although the non-beneficiary does not have 
access to a court with full benefits of Article 6 ECHR, the crucial point is that the non-
beneficiary is still able to avail himself of the ECHR’s protection within arbitral 
proceedings. As demonstrated in section C(3), an arbitration agreement does not 
automatically entail the renunciation of all guarantees contained in Article 6 ECHR. 
Moreover, arbitration constitutes one of the means under Article 13 ECHR for an 
individual to obtain a remedy for the violation of his rights.121 Some authorities interpret 
the ECtHR’s decisions as indirectly confirming that arbitrators are under an obligation 
to observe Article 6 ECHR.122 Similarly, national courts in ECHR Contracting States 
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have ruled that arbitral proceedings must comply with either Article 6 ECHR as such,123 
or its underlying principles.124  
 It seems that by waiving the right of equal access to a court as compared to its 
contractual partner, the non-beneficiary of a unilateral option clause does not put itself 
in a position which can be described as lacking appropriate safeguards for the protection 
of its interests. The non-beneficiary is still able to have its claims decided in accordance 
with the fundamental principles of due process guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR, namely 
the right of equal treatment and the right to be heard. It is true, however, that the 
beneficiary of a unilateral option clause has the advantage of, for example, choosing to 
initiate arbitration if it deems confidential proceedings to be in its interests, while the 
non-beneficiary could have benefited more from public hearing in a court. Also, the 
beneficiary has the opportunity to make use of a home court advantage by initiating 
litigation in a jurisdiction completely unfamiliar to the non-beneficiary. Nevertheless, 
it appears that the availability of arbitration to the non-beneficiary is in itself a 
‘minimum safeguard’ as required by the ECtHR that is sufficient to justify the 
renunciation of the right of equal access to a court. 
5. Summary 
The waiver of the right of equal access to a court by means of unilateral option clauses 
satisfies the requirements for a valid waiver of a right under Article 6 ECHR. In 
particular, the ECHR permits the waiver of the right of equal access to a court. A 
unilateral option clause is normally agreed by a party ‘of his own free will’ and is 
expressed in unequivocal language. The waiver of the right of equal access to a court is 
accompanied by ‘minimum guarantees commensurate with its importance’ since the 
non-beneficiary is still able to have its claim considered in arbitral proceedings where 
guarantees of Article 6 ECHR are partially applicable. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
This article assessed unilateral option clauses from the perspective of the ECHR. The 
analysis of decisions rendered by English and Russian courts revealed that these 
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agreements might be challenged on the basis of Article 6 ECHR. In particular, the cases 
showed that unilateral option clauses trigger not only the right of access to a court, but 
also the right of equal access to a court. It was then established that unilateral arbitration 
and unilateral litigation clauses affect Article 6 ECHR guarantees differently. A 
unilateral litigation clause constitutes a waiver by the non-beneficiary of both the right 
of access to a court and the right of equal access to a court. The right of access to a court 
is waived because once the non-beneficiary signs a unilateral litigation clause, it can no 
longer go to a court. The right of equal access to a court is waived since the beneficiary, 
unlike the non-beneficiary, reserves an ability to initiate litigation. A unilateral 
arbitration clause constitutes a waiver by the non-beneficiary of only the right of equal 
access to a court. The right of access to a court is not waived because the non-
beneficiary retains an ability to bring its claim before a court. The right of equal access 
is waived since the beneficiary can rely on its arbitration option and preclude a court 
action instituted by the non-beneficiary. Having scrutinised the waiver of the right of 
equal access to a court by means of unilateral option agreements against requirements 
developed in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, it is concluded that these clauses are 
compatible with the ECHR. 
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